Getting more than the judgment debtor can give? by Dixon, Bill
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Dixon, William M. (2010) Getting more than the judgment debtor can give?
The Queensland Lawyer, 30(4), pp. 184-189.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/42293/
c© Coyright 2010 Thomson Reuters (Australia/NZ)
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
1 
 
Getting More Than the Judgment Debtor can give? 
Bill Dixon  
Prior to the decision of the High Court in Black v Garnock
1
 it was an established principle in 
Queensland that a judgment creditor acting under an enforcement warrant could take no interest 
beyond what the judgment debtor could give.  However, the decision of the High Court called this 
principle into question.  This article examines the current position in the context of s 120 of the Land 
Title Act 1994 (Qld), Queensland Titles Office practice and standard contractual provisions.  This 
examination is further informed by the recent decision of Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v 
Doneley.
2
 
1. Introduction 
This article examines a particular aspect of the operation of s 120 of the Land Title 
Act 1994 (Qld).  That section provides: 
120 Transfer of lots sold in execution 
(1) If a lot is sold under a registered writ of execution, the sheriff, registrar or clerk of the court of 
the relevant court may execute an instrument of transfer to the purchaser. 
(2) On registration of the transfer, the transferee becomes the registered owner of the lot subject 
to 
a. registered interests; and 
b. equitable mortages notified by caveat lodged before registration of the writ of 
execution. 
As can be seen, s 120 (2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) specifies those interests 
which a transferee from the sheriff, registrar or clerk of the relevant court will become 
subject to upon registration of the transfer.  However, it is important to recognise that 
s 120(2) may only be applicable following registration of the transfer and does not 
necessarily regulate the position prior to registration of the transfer.  This matter and 
the impact of the High Court decision in Black v Garnock,3 as subsequently 
interpreted by Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Doneley,4 are examined in this 
article. 
2 An Established Principle 
Prior to the decision of the High Court in Black v Garnock,5 when considering the 
position of a purchaser from a sheriff, registrar or clerk of the court under a 
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registered writ of execution or enforcement warrant,6 it was widely accepted that the 
interest that was sold was the judgment debtor's interest in the registered lot. 
A judgment creditor can take no interest whatever, either legal or equitable, beyond what he 
acquires from the debtor; such an interest in fact as the debtor himself could give, and no 
other.
7 
On this view, the registration of a writ of execution or enforcement warrant gave the 
sheriff or relevant officer no greater power than the judgment debtor had.  If the 
judgment debtor had no beneficial interest in the registered lot then it would not be 
possible for the sheriff, Registrar or clerk of the court to pass a beneficial interest in 
the registered lot to any purchaser.  The interest which the sheriff took was whatever 
interest the judgment debtor had at the time of lodgment of the writ of execution.  As 
stated by Professor Sykes:  
… it is a well settled principle that the transferee from the sheriff takes merely what interest 
the judgment debtor had at the time of such service or entry.  Thus if at such time there was 
an equitable proprietary interest (whether it is embodied in an instrument which is registrable 
under the Act or springs from an unregistrable transaction) such interest has priority.
8 
These legal principles were illustrated in Bond v McClay.9  The relevant facts were 
as follows:  
Bond was the registered owner of a lot. 
25 June 1900 – Bond, as part of a marriage settlement, executed a Nomination of 
Trustees in the prescribed form to transfer the registered lot to the plaintiffs. 
Bond incurred debts to McClay. 
Judgment was obtained against Bond by McClay. 
4 April 1901 – McClay lodged a writ of fi fa for registration. 
18 April 1901 – The plaintiffs lodged the nomination of trustees for registration. 
22 April 1901 – The writ of fi fa was registered. 
26 June 1901 – The plaintiffs lodged a caveat. 
July 1901 – The land was sold at public auction by the sheriff and purchased by the 
defendant, McClay. 
A transfer to McClay was executed by the sheriff and was lodged for registration (but 
was unregistered due to the caveat lodged by the plaintiffs). 
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On these facts, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held that when 
the writ of execution was lodged (and later became effective through registration) the 
judgment debtor held no beneficial interest in the property.  As a result it was not 
possible for the sheriff to pass a beneficial interest to the purchaser.  The sheriff 
could only sell the interest that the judgment debtor had in the registered lot. 
The legal principles outlined in Bond v McClay10 were confirmed by what was 
accepted as the leading Queensland decision in this area, a decision of the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Commonwealth Trading Bank of 
Australia v Austral Lighting Pty Ltd.11 
It is useful to consider the facts of this leading decision:  
1982 – C gave a mortgage to the Commonwealth Bank. 
16 June 1983 – Austral Lighting Pty Ltd had a writ of fi fa issued to it in relation to the 
land of C. 
23 August 1983 – The writ of fi fa was lodged. 
24 August 1983 – The Commonwealth Bank's mortgage was lodged for registration. 
25 August 1983 – A caveat was lodged by the Commonwealth Bank. 
11 October 1983 – The writ of fi fa was registered. 
On these facts the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held that the 
sheriff's sale was subject to the rights of the Commonwealth Bank's prior equitable 
mortgage.  It was submitted on the basis of s 35 of the now repealed Real Property 
Act 1877 (Qld) (the predecessor to s 120 of the Land Title Act 1994) that the 
Commonwealth Bank's equitable mortgage could not prevail (on the basis that the 
Commonwealth Bank's caveat had not been lodged before the writ of fi fa was 
lodged for registration).  This argument was rejected.  Section 35 of the Real 
Property Act 1877 (Qld) was only applicable in circumstances where the transfer 
from a sheriff, registrar or clerk of the court to a purchaser had been registered.  Until 
such time as the transfer was registered, a prior equitable interest could be set up 
and if appropriate, protected by injunction.12 
Accordingly, under this view, until a transfer from the relevant court officer was 
registered, a prior equitable interest (that is an interest created by the judgment 
debtor prior to lodgment of the enforcement warrant) could be raised and a caveat 
lodged and/or an injunction sought.  In these circumstances the priority dispute 
arising between unregistered interests would be determined in accordance with 
usual doctrines applicable to contests between persons with equitable titles. 
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Where an instrument was lodged before the lodgment of an enforcement warrant, 
the instruments would be entitled to registration according to the dates of their 
production.  For example, if a transfer from a judgment debtor was lodged, but 
unregistered, when an enforcement warrant was lodged, this transfer was entitled to 
registration.  The enforcement warrant would be requisitioned to be withdrawn. 
On this view, the practical upshot was that a purchaser from the relevant court officer 
was in an uncertain position.  Only upon registration of the transfer would the 
purchaser be entitled to the protection of indefeasibility.13  Until such time as 
registration of the transfer occurred, a purchaser from the sheriff may be bound by 
equitable interests that were created by the judgment debtor, prior to lodgment of an 
enforcement warrant.  This in turn may defeat the purchaser's title or mean that the 
title was encumbered.  This result could follow regardless of whether the interests 
created by the judgment debtor, prior to lodgment of the enforcement warrant, were 
on the register or not. 
3 The Impact of Black v Garnock  
The previously established fundamental principle, that a judgment creditor may take 
no interest beyond what the judgment debtor could give, was called into question by 
the decision of the High Court in Black v Garnock.14  The relevant facts were: 
The Garnocks and the Luffs, as purchasers, entered a contract to purchase a rural 
property from Mrs Smith with settlement due on 24 August 2005.  On 23 August 
2005, a creditor obtained a writ against Mrs Smith from the District Court of New 
South Wales. 
No caveat was lodged on behalf of the purchasers prior to settlement (there being no 
equivalent, in New South Wales, of the Queensland settlement notice mechanism). 
On the day of settlement:  
 The purchasers' solicitors conducted a check search of the title at 8.55 am 
(which revealed nothing adverse to the purchasers' interest);  
 Sometime between 9.20 am and 9.30 am, certain discussions took place 
between the solicitors for the creditor and the solicitors for the purchasers. 
While the solicitors for the creditor indicated their intention to ‘stop the sale’ 
they did not indicate their intention to register the writ;  
 The writ, obtained the day before, was recorded at 11.53 am; and  
 Settlement took place at 2.00 pm.  
When the purchasers attempted to register their transfer they were advised that the 
New South Wales Registrar-General would not register the transfer because of the 
prior registration of the writ. 
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In adopting this stance, the Registrar-General relied on s 105A(2) of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) that prohibits the Registrar-General from registering, 
during the six month ‘protected period’, a dealing that affected land subject to a writ 
of execution.  In a 3-2 decision, the High Court upheld the correctness of this 
approach and thereby upheld the interest of the judgment creditors under the writ of 
execution against the earlier unregistered equitable interest of the purchasers from 
the judgment debtor.  In particular, the majority held that a subsequent sale of the 
property during the six month protected period by the Sheriff acting under the writ 
would defeat the earlier equitable interest of the purchasers.  The majority 
considered this result to be consistent with s 105B(2) of the Real Property Act 1900 
(NSW) which provides, in part, that the effect of the registration of a transfer from the 
Sheriff is that the purchaser from the Sheriff holds the land transferred free from all 
estates and interests except such as are recorded in the relevant folio of the Register 
or on the relevant registered dealing. 
The judges in the majority were Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ with Gleeson CJ 
and Crennan J dissenting.  In their joint judgment, Gummow and Hayne JJ were 
prepared to discount the purchaser's unregistered interest in the land in 
circumstances where that equitable interest had not been protected by the lodgment 
of a caveat prior to the lodgment of the writ of execution.  In their view, the bare fact 
that the purchasers made their contract of sale with the judgment debtor before the 
writ was recorded did not constitute sufficient reason to intercept the operation of the 
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).  Significantly, the other majority judge, Callinan J 
expressly disapproved15 of the approach evinced in Commonwealth Trading Bank of 
Australia v Austral Lighting Pty Ltd,16 namely that an equity created prior to lodgment 
of a writ of execution may be set up until a transfer from the Sheriff has been 
registered. 
Although the provisions of the New South Wales legislation under consideration by 
the High Court did not exactly mirror the provisions in the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), 
the decision was considered significant to the extent that the approach of the 
majority judges was inconsistent with the principle that a judgment creditor may take 
no interest beyond what the judgment debtor could give at the time of lodgment of 
the writ of execution.  However, to the extent that the High Court’s decision was 
concerned with the impact of particular statutory provisions and the particular 
mischief that these New South Wales statutory provisions were designed to remedy, 
it was arguable that the decision should have been viewed as being confined to the 
New South Wales legislation. 
Fortunately, guidance on this issue has now been provided with the decision of 
Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Doneley.17  For present purposes, the relevant 
facts were: 
23 March 2009 – Default judgment was entered by Secure Funding against Doneley. 
14 August 2009 – Doneley entered into a contract of sale for the land 
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26 August 2009 – An enforcement warrant issued on behalf of Secure Funding. 
14 September 2009 – The contract for the sale of the land settled. 
21 September – A writ based on the enforcement warrant was registered. 
28 September – The buyers lodged a release of mortgage and transfer for the land. 
30 September – A requisition issued from the Land Registry advising the buyers of 
the writ. 
24 December 2009 – The buyers lodged a caveat over the land. 
Secure Funding argued that the High Court’s decision in Black v Garnock18 meant 
that the court should declare that the Sheriff may sell the land the subject of the 
enforcement warrant.  In response, the buyers argued that Black v Garnock19 should 
be regarded as being confined to the New South Wales legislation and that the court 
was bound to follow the decision of the Full Court of the Queensland Supreme Court 
in Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Austral Lighting Pty Ltd.20 
Having carefully considered the relevant case law, Martin J held that the decision of 
the High Court in Black v Garnock21 should be confined to the New South Wales 
legislation and the particular mischief that the 1976 amendments to the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) was intended to prevent namely to reduce or postpone the 
rights of holders of equitable interests in land.  In this regard, Martin J observed: 
The decision in Black v Garnock is, then, based upon those provisions of the Real Property 
Act 1900 (NSW) which were specifically designed to change the law so far as the purchasers 
under enforcement warrants and the holders of equitable interests were concerned. It was 
neither said nor implied by Gummow and Hayne JJ that their decision would have been the 
same had there not been the 1976 amendments to the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).  The 
Land Title Act 1994 does not contain similar provisions to those in s 105B of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) and it should not, in my respectful opinion, be construed in a way 
which would dictate the same result as that which flowed in Black v Garnock.
22 
Although unable to order the removal of the writ as requested by the buyers, Martin J 
noted that buyers could seek an injunction which would prevent the Sheriff from 
exercising the power of sale until the term in s 117(b) of the Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) expired. 
4. Queensland Titles Office Practice and Standard Contractual Provisions 
Informed by the judgment of Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Doneley,23 it is 
useful to consider how similar factual circumstances to those prevailing in Black v 
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Garnock24 are likely to now be dealt with in terms of Queensland Titles Office 
practice.  In order to consider this matter further, the impact of standard contractual 
provisions must also be considered. 
4.1. Background – Impact of Standard Contractual Provisions  
If a check search of the title is conducted on the day of settlement and an 
enforcement warrant affecting the property is discovered, under the standard REIQ 
contract the Seller will be in breach of warranty (namely that at settlement there will 
be no unsatisfied judgment, order or writ affecting the property).  The discovery of 
the writ upon a check search being conducted will trigger a right in the purchaser to 
terminate the contract by notice to the Seller. 
Unless the purchaser or the purchaser's representative fail to conduct a check 
search of the title on the day of settlement,25 any potential difficulties arising from the 
lodgement of a Form 12 Request to Register Writ/Warrant of Execution with office 
copy of the writ of execution (subsequently referred to as a ‘Form 12’) should be 
confined to circumstances where the Form 12 is lodged after the check search is 
conducted but before registration of the transfer to the purchaser. 
It is possible to envisage four (4) different scenarios that could arise.  Each of these 
scenarios will be separately considered. 
4.2.1 Lodgment of Transfer precedes Lodgment of Form 12  
The first scenario is where a transfer from a judgment debtor is lodged, but is 
unregistered, when a Form 12 is lodged. 
In these circumstances, by virtue of s 117 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) the 
purchaser is not bound by the writ of execution until it is registered, whether or not 
there is actual or constructive notice of the writ.  As the transfer has priority it will be 
registered.  The writ of execution will not be capable of registration as the registered 
owner of the lot will no longer be the judgment debtor.  Accordingly, the Form 12 will 
be requisitioned to be withdrawn. 
4.2.2 Lodgment of Form 12 precedes Lodgment of Transfer  
The second scenario is where a Form 12 is lodged and registered after the check 
search but before the lodgment of a transfer to a purchaser from the judgment 
debtor.  The purchaser has not deposited a settlement notice nor has the purchaser 
lodged a caveat. 
In these circumstances, if the approach evinced in Black v Garnock26 (in similar 
factual circumstances) were to be followed in Queensland the Form 12 would have 
priority.  However, adopting the approach of Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v 
Doneley,27 the decision of the High Court in Black v Garnock28 would be confined to 
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the New South Wales legislation there under consideration.  On this basis, in light of 
the existing Queensland authority previously discussed it would be arguable that the 
purchaser's equity created prior to the lodgement of the Form 12 may be set up until 
any transfer from the Sheriff has been registered.  
It should be noted that in the case where the transfer was pursuant to the exercise of 
a power of sale under a prior registered mortgage, s 120A of the Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) makes it clear that the registration of the writ does not prevent registration of 
the transfer and on registration of the transfer, the registrar must cancel registration 
of the writ of execution. 
4.2.3 With settlement notice deposited prior to settlement  
The third scenario is where a settlement notice is deposited (referring to the interest 
of the transferee from the judgment debtor), then a Form 12 is lodged after the check 
search but before the lodgment of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment 
debtor. 
In these circumstances, there is judicial authority that the effect of the settlement 
notice deposited before the Form 12 is lodged is to prevent registration of the Form 
12.29  On this basis, there is no impediment to the registration of the transfer to the 
purchaser from the judgment debtor. 
4.2.4 With caveat lodged prior to settlement  
The fourth scenario is where a caveat is lodged (notifying the equitable interest of 
the purchaser from the judgment debtor), then a Form 12 is lodged after the check 
search but before the lodgement of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment 
debtor. 
In these circumstances, there is judicial authority that the effect of the caveat notified 
on the title before the Form 12 is lodged is to prevent registration of the Form 1230 
(unless the caveator specifies in the caveat that it is not to apply to a Form 12).  On 
this basis, there is no impediment to the registration of the transfer to the purchaser 
from the judgment debtor. 
4.2.5 Analysis 
As can be seen from the four separate scenarios that have been considered, the 
potential difficulties that Black v Garnock31 may raise as to the correct interpretation 
of the Queensland legislation would seem to be restricted to the second scenario.  In 
turn, this scenario could only arise in circumstances where the purchaser or the 
purchaser's representative fails to protect the purchaser’s unregistered interest by 
way of a caveat or a settlement notice deposited before the settlement date.  Given 
the prescriptive requirements of the Queensland Conveyancing Protocol, it would be 
hoped that such factual circumstances would be rare indeed. 
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5. Conclusion 
As noted in this article, there is a long standing Queensland authority that, section 
120(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) is only of application where a transfer to a 
purchaser (from the sheriff, registrar or clerk of the relevant court as the case may 
be) has been registered.  The statutory provision is not applicable where registration 
has not occurred.  This has been confirmed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court 
of Queensland in Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Austral Lighting Pty 
Ltd32 where it was held that s 35 of the Real Property Act 1877 (Qld) (the 
predecessor of s 120 of the Land Title Act 1994) is not relevant when considering the 
position of a prior equity holder where the transfer has not been registered.  Section 
120(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 will only protect a purchaser from the sheriff or 
court officer when the transfer has been registered and an ‘equity created prior to the 
lodgement of the writ of execution may be set up until the Sheriff's transfer has been 
registered.’33 
Although the result in Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Austral Lighting 
Pty Ltd34 was expressly disapproved by Callinan J in Black v Garnock35 and it may 
be argued that the underlying principle in the Queensland decision was called into 
question by the joint judgment of the other majority members of the High Court 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ), if the approach of Martin J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v 
Doneley36 is followed it would result in the decision of the High Court in Black v 
Garnock37 being confined to the New South Wales legislation there under 
consideration. 
Even if Martin J’s approach in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Doneley38 should not be 
followed subsequently, provided a check search of the title is conducted on the day 
of settlement, any residual difficulties that Black v Garnock39 may raise as to the 
correct interpretation of the Queensland legislation should be restricted, at least in 
the conveyancing context, to the particular circumstances considered in the second 
scenario in this article.  Given that this scenario will only arise where the purchaser 
or the purchaser's representative fails to protect the purchaser’s unregistered interest 
by way of a settlement notice or caveat deposited before the settlement date, the 
need for compliance with the requirements of the Queensland Conveyancing 
Protocol looms large in this discussion. 
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